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ABSTRACT: This paper presents a formalization of informal logic using the Carneades Argumentation 
System, a formal, computational model of argument that consists of a formal model of argument 
graphs and audiences. Conflicts between pro and con arguments are resolved using proof standards, 
such as preponderance of the evidence. Carneades also formalizes argumentation schemes. Schemes 
can be used to check whether a given argument instantiates the types of argument deemed 
normatively appropriate for the type of dialogue. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
To attempt a formalization of informal logic, we need to decide what requirements 
something has to meet to be an informal logic. We take the following ten 
characteristics of informal logic as our guide. (1) Informal logic recognizes the 
linked-convergent distinction, (2) serial arguments and (3) divergent arguments. 
Informal logic includes three postulates of good argument in the RSA triangle: (4) 
relevance, (5) premise acceptability and (6) sufficiency. (7) Informal logic has 
recognized the importance of pro-contra (conductive) arguments. (8) Informal logic 
is concerned with analyzing real arguments. Johnson (2006, p. 246) expressed this 
characteristic as follows: “[Informal logic] may be seen as a turn toward seeing 
argument in a real-life setting as opposed to the artificiality of the examples 
associated with formal deductive logic”. There is also a ninth characteristic, (9) the 
appreciation of the importance of argument construction: “If one is to teach 
students about real arguments, then it is not enough to focus only on evaluation; one 
must include the task of argument construction - an emphasis taken from colleagues 
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in rhetoric” Johnson (2006, p. 248). Argument construction was traditionally called 
the art of argument invention in rhetoric (Kienpointner, 1997). (10) There is also 
possibly a tenth characteristic, one that is very important for rhetoric, the notion of 
audience. Blair (2001, p. 366) stated that there is general agreement among 
argumentation scholars that argumentation is a complex social, speech activity 
involving more than one party, adding “One cannot argue without at least an 
imaginary audience or interlocutor”. This tenth characteristic is not a problem for 
Carneades, since the Carneades system uses a formal audience model in its 
argument evaluation procedure.  
There are many automated systems to assist with argument diagramming 
(Scheuer et al., 2010). Carneades, however is one of the few argument diagramming 
tools based on a formal, computational model of argument. Carneades is named 
after the Greek skeptical philosopher (Gordon & Walton, 2006) and is open source 
software, available for downloading at http://carneades.github.com/. 
The word ‘formal’, as used in writings on logic and philosophy, can have 
seven different meanings. One of these meanings, distinguished by Barth & Krabbe 
(1982, pp. 14-15), refers to a simple, fundamental general term referring to a 
concept. For example, one might cite the term triangle, which in the Platonic 
philosophy refers to a general concept of triangularity that is common to all 
triangles. The second meaning is that of a well-formed formula, for example in a 
propositional or predicate logic. This meaning is syntactic in nature. The third 
meaning is that of a formal system, with a set of axioms and inference rules used to 
derive theorems from the axioms. The fourth meaning refers to formal logic, which 
is a species of formal system. A fifth meaning is that of a formal theory, that is, an 
axiomatization of a theory in a formal logic. A sixth meaning is that of a 
mathematical structure consisting of sets and operations on the sets. An example 
would be an algebraic structure. The seventh meaning is that if a formal procedure, 
for example the kinds of procedures used in court cases. 
The point is worth emphasizing that there are formal systems other than 
calculi for classical logic, and that Carneades is a formal, computational model of 
argument. It is computational, because the model consists of mathematical structure 
whose operations are all computable. It is formal, because there is a formal calculus 
for computable functions (lambda calculus). 
The rest of this paper presents Carneades in more detail and then shows how 
Carneades can be understood as a formalization of informal logic, realizing all of its 
leading characteristics. 
 
2. THE CARNEADES ARUMENTATION SYSTEM 
 
Carneades formalizes argument graphs, as bipartite, directed graphs, consisting of 
argument nodes linked to statement nodes. Argument nodes are of two types, pro 
and con. Carneades argument diagrams (or maps) visualize these argument graphs. 
Conceptually it is important to distinguish such visualizations from the underlying 
mathematical structure being visualized. Argument graphs can be visualized in 
different ways and levels of abstraction, for different purposes.  
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Argument graphs define the structure of arguments in a particular stage of 
dialogue as follows.  
 
Definition (Argument Graph) An argument graph is a bipartite, directed, labeled 
graph, consisting of statement nodes and argument nodes connected by premise 
and conclusion edges. Formally, an argument graph is a structure ⟨𝑆, A, P, 𝐶⟩, where: 
 
 𝑆 is a set of statement nodes, 
 𝐴 is a set of argument nodes, 
 𝑃 is a set of premises, and 
 𝐶 is a set of conclusions. 
 
To see an example, look ahead to figure 3. The statement nodes are the rectangular 
boxes. The argument nodes are the two circles containing the plus signs. The two 
premises are the statements in the text boxes on the right. The conclusion is the 
statement that the death penalty is wrong.  
Let 𝐿 be a propositional language, consisting of a set of propositional letters. 
Each statement node in 𝑆 is labeled with a propositional letter in the language 𝐿. 
Each argument node in 𝐴 is a structure ⟨𝑠, d⟩, where 
 
 𝑠 is a Boolean value which is true if the argument node is strict and 
false if it is defeasible. 
 𝑑 is a Boolean value, representing the direction of the argument, which 
is true if the argument is pro its conclusion and false if it is con its 
conclusion. 
 
The premises and conclusions of an argument graph represent the edges of the 
graph, connecting the statement and argument nodes. Each premise in 𝑃 is a 
structure ⟨𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑝⟩, where 
 
1. 𝑠∈𝑆, 
2. 𝑎∈𝐴, 
3. 𝑝 is a Boolean value denoting the polarity of the premise, i.e. 
positive or negative. If 𝑝 is true, then the premise is positive, 
otherwise it is negative. 
 
Each conclusion in 𝐶 is a structure ⟨𝑎, s⟩, where 
 
1. 𝑎∈𝐴, and 
2. 𝑠∈𝑆 
 
Every argument node has exactly one conclusion. That is, for every argument 𝑎∈𝐴 
there exists exactly one ⟨𝑎,_⟩∈𝐶. An argument node may have zero or more 
premises. That is, it need not be the case that for every 𝑎∈𝐴 there exists a premise 
⟨_,,_⟩∈𝑃. 
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Argument graphs are evaluated, relative to audiences, to determine the 
acceptability of statements in a stage (Gordon & Walton, 2009). Audiences are 
modeled as a set of assumptions and an assignment of weights to argument nodes. 
Where L is a propositional language as defined above, an audience is a structure 
<assumptions, weight>, where assumptions ⊆ L is a consistent set of literals assumed 
to be acceptable by the audience and weight is a partial function mapping arguments 
to real numbers in the range 0.0...1.0, representing the relative weights assigned by 
the audience to the arguments (Gordon & Walton, 2011). 
In (Gordon, Prakken, & Walton, 2007) the acceptability of statements was 
defined directly, via a set of mutually recursive functions, but only for acyclic 
argument graphs. Conflicts between pro and con arguments are resolved using 
proof standards, such as preponderance of the evidence and beyond reasonable 
doubt, inspired by the legal domain. More recently, we have found a way to evaluate 
cyclic argument graphs, in a way compatible with the semantics of the original 
system, via a mapping from argument graphs to Dung abstract argumentation 
frameworks (Dung, 1995), similar to the mapping of ASPIC+ (Prakken, 2010; Bin & 
Prakken, 2012).  
Carneades also formalizes argumentation schemes. Schemes can be used to 
construct or reconstruct arguments, as well as to check whether arguments are 
“valid”, i.e. whether they properly instantiate the types of argument deemed 
normatively appropriate for the type of dialogue.  
In Carneades argument maps, statement nodes are shown as propositions in 
text boxes. Argument nodes are displayed as circles, with a + or – sign inside the 
circle, to distinguish pro and con arguments, respectively. Premises and conclusions 
are visualized as lines and arrows, respectively, connecting statement and argument 
nodes. For an example the reader can look ahead to figure 7, which represents three 
arguments leading to a conclusion. The top two arguments are pro arguments 
supporting the conclusion. The argument at the bottom is a con argument that gives 
a reason not to accept the conclusion. 
Carneades is capable of representing instances of any kind of argumentation 
scheme, whether deductive, inductive or defeasible, such as argument from expert 
opinion. The conclusion of a defeasible argument is only presumptively true. 
Defeasible arguments can be defeated by counterarguments of various kinds. 
Carneades has mainly been tested on examples of legal argumentation, but it is open 
domain software, meaning that it can be applied in other contexts of use, including 
everyday argumentation.  
 
3. SINGLE, LINKED, CONVERGENT, SERIAL AND DIVERGENT ARGUMENTS 
 
The first step in understanding an argument diagramming system is to see how it 
represents linked and convergent arguments. A linked argument is one where the 
two (or more) premises go together to support the conclusion. A convergent 
argument is one where each premise (or group of premises) function together to 
support the conclusion.  
As types of structures that appear in argument diagrams, informal logic 
recognizes five kinds of arguments, single, linked, convergent, serial and divergent. 
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In the simplest kind of case, called the single argument, there is only one premise 
and one conclusion (Walton, 1996, p. 84). The following example of a single 
argument is cited in (Walton, 1996, p. 84): Webb was promoted to vice president, 
therefore she will move to Pittsburgh. How this example is represented by 
Carneades is shown in figure 1, where the plus symbol in the argument node 
indicates that this is a pro argument. Carneades uses a minus sign in the argument 
node to indicate a con argument.  
 
Webb will move 
to Pittsburgh.
Webb was promoted 
to vice-president.
 
Figure 1: Single Argument in Carneades 
 
A linked argument is an argument that has more than one premise, and its 
premises function together to give support to the conclusion (Walton, 1996, p. 85). 
According to (Copi & Cohen, 1990, p. 20) in a linked argument with two premises, 
each premise supports the conclusion through the mediation of the other so that 
neither supports the conclusion independently. One of the examples given in 
(Walton, 1996, p. 87) is an instance of practical reasoning: my goal is to get to 
Leiden, taking the Maaldrift is the way to get to Leiden, therefore I should take the 
Maaldrift.  
 
I should take 
the Maaldrift.
My goal is to 
get to Leiden.
Taking the Maaldrift is 
the way to get to Leiden.
+PR
 
Figure 2: Linked Argument in Carneades 
 
The argumentation scheme for practical reasoning is represented in the node 
by the +PR notation, where the plus sign indicates that it used as a pro argument. 
The practical reasoning scheme (in its bare-bones form) represents the following 
form of argument: I (an agent) have a goal G; carrying out action A is the way to 
obtain G; therefore I should carry out A. 
In a convergent argument each premise gives independent support to the 
conclusion. An example (paraphrased from Copi & Cohen, 1990, p. 22) has the 
conclusion that the death penalty is wrong. The two premises given to support this 
conclusion are (1) there is not enough evidence to show that the death penalty is a 
deterrent and (2) there are better and more effective ways to deal with violent 
crime.  
 
The death 
penalty is wrong.
There is not enough evidence to show 
that the death penalty is a deterrent.
There are better and more effective 
ways to deal with violent crime.
 
Figure 3: Convergent Argument in Carneades 
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As indicated in figure 3, convergent arguments are represented using 
multiple argument nodes, instead of using a bracketing line to join the premises 
together and then drawing the arrow from the bracketing line to the conclusion. 
In a serial argument, often called a chain argument, the conclusion of one 
argument also functions as a premise in a second argument, and so forth, forming a 
chain of arguments. Typical Carneades argument maps display lots of chained 
arguments, as the example (from Walton, 2013) drawn by the Carneades 
visualization tool in figure 4 shows. 
 
 
Figure 4: Screen Shot Showing an Argument Map with a Chained Argumentation 
Structure 
 
This map includes an example of a con argument, indicated by the minus sign 
in the node at the bottom left. It also shows a chained argument. The linked 
argument at the right, an argument from expert opinion, leads to the conclusion that 
the portrait showed evidence of being drawn by a left handed artist. This 
proposition, in turn, serves as a premise in the linked con argument rebuttting the 
conclusion that painting P is a Klimt. Note that although argumentation schemes are 
not displayed in figure 4, they are represented in the underlying data model of the 
argument graph. 
Figure 4 illustrates an argument graph that has been evaluated by the 
computational model. Statement and argument nodes are evaluated to be one of 
three values: in, out, or undecided . In argument maps, in nodes are shown filled with 
green color, out nodes with red color and undecided nodes with white color. 
Redundantly, to assist colorblind readers and enable black and white printing, in 
statement nodes also contain a ✔ mark, and out statement nodes an ✘ mark. 
Statements which have been accepted or rejected by the audience are in or out, 
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respectively. The values of the remaining statement nodes are computed using proof 
standards and the weights assigned by the audience to the argument nodes.  
A divergent argument (Walton, 1996, p. 91) is one in which two separate 
conclusions are each supported by the same premise. The following example from 
(Walton, 1996, 91) was originally taken from a Sherlock Holmes story. Smith is not 
the murderer, therefore (1) Robinson had nothing to do with the crime, and (2) 
Lady Gregg’s display of grief was merely a tactic to cover up the finding of the 
revolver. Figure 5 shows how divergent arguments are modeled in Carneades.  
 
Lady Gregg’s display of 
grief was a mere tactic.
Robinson had nothing 
to do with the crime.
Smith is not a murderer.
 
Figure 5: Carneades Argument Map of a Divergent Argument 
 
In Carneades, premises and conclusions are relations between argument nodes and 
statement nodes. The same statement node can be a premise or conclusion of more 
than one argument node. Figures 3 and 5 provide illustrations. In Figure 3, the 
statement node for "The death penalty is wrong." is a conclusion of two argument 
nodes, with different premises. In Figure 5, the statement node for "Smith is not a 
murderer" is a premise of two different argument nodes, with different conclusions.  
 
4. THE RSA TRIANGLE 
 
Blair (2012, p. 87) wrote that when he and Ralph Johnson first wrote their textbook 
Logical Self-defense (first edition, 1977), they used the relevance sufficiency 
acceptability (RSA) triangle to determine whether an argument is a good one. 
According to the RSA principle, an argument is a good one if its grounds (or 
premises) singly or in combination meet three criteria. First, the argument needs to 
be relevant as a support for the conclusion. Second the premises have to be 
individually acceptable. Third, taken together the premises have to be sufficient to 
support the claim that is the conclusion of the argument. Blair (2012, p. 88) wrote 
that he and Johnson had the RSA criteria in mind as a replacement for what he called 
the traditional soundness criterion, which maintains that a good argument is a 
sound argument, and a sound argument is one that is deductively valid and has true 
premises. 
 
5. ACCEPTABILITY 
 
A simple example of how the evaluation procedure will work is shown in figure 6.  
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I should take M.
I have back pain.
Taking M would relieve my back pain.
My goal is to relieve my back pain.+PR
 
Figure 6: Proving the Conclusion by an Argument with All Premises Accepted 
 
In this example, all the premises have been accepted by the audience and are thus in, 
as indicated by their appearing in the three darkened boxes on the right. The 
argument node containing the scheme for practical reasoning is also in, since all of 
its premises are in. Finally, the conclusion of the argument is in, because it is 
supported by an in pro argument and has no con arguments. The values (in, out, 
undecided) of the nodes in the argument graph are computed by the model.  
 
6. SUFFICIENCY  
 
Carneades is built around the idea of modeling sufficiency by using proof standards 
to aggregate pro and con arguments (Gordon & Walton, 2009). The conclusion of an 
argument is in (acceptable) if has been accepted by the audience or it satisfies the 
proof standard appropriate for the type of dialogue. Proof standards have a legal 
flavour, and the notions of proof standards and burdens of proof modeled in 
Carneades are motivated by our interest in legal applications. Several legal 
standards of proof exist, for example the preponderance of the evidence standard, 
also known as the balance of probabilities, the standard applicable in civil cases. The 
preponderance standard is meet by the proposition at issue if its pro arguments are 
stronger than its con arguments, no matter how much stronger they may be. The 
beyond reasonable doubt standard, the highest standard used in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, and the standard applicable in criminal law, requires that the 
arguments supporting the claim must not be amenable to any opposing arguments 
from critical questions that can leave any doubt open on whether the claim is 
acceptable. This standard does not require a proof to show that a claim is true with 
absolute certainty. It is not a standard of beyond all doubt. It only needs to be strong 
enough to overcome a reasonable doubt that can be raised by arguments or 
questions put forward by the defense. The clear and convincing evidence standard, 
lying between the other two standards, is higher than the preponderance of the 
evidence standard but not as high as the beyond reasonable doubt standard. The 
substantial evidence standard requires that there are at least some reasonably 
strong arguments supporting the claim, in contrast to the scintilla of evidence 
standard, which requires only the smallest bit of evidence to have been brought 
forward by supporting arguments. These are just some examples of standards of 
evidence that are applicable in legal argumentation. The kinds of standards of 
evidence that might be applicable in everyday conversational arguments might not 
necessarily be perfectly coextensive with these standards. The default proof 
standard in Carneades is preponderance of the evidence, but can be changed by the 
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user. The menu for changing the proof standard is visible at the bottom on the left in 
figure 4, showing the preponderance of evidence standard. 
 
7. ARGUMENT CONSTRUCTION AND RELEVANCE OF ARGUMENTATION  
 
Ballnat and Gordon (2010) provided a method of argument construction for 
Carneades, and Walton and Gordon (2012) have shown how the method can be 
applied to arguments of the kind that are of central interest for informal logic. To 
apply the method, the arguer needs to build his argument with the goal of getting 
the audience to accept some designated proposition that represents his thesis to be 
proved by basing his arguments on premises that his audience either accepts or can 
be led to accept by argumentation. If the audience accepts the premises, and if the 
argument is structurally correct by application of argumentation schemes, the 
audience will also need to accept the conclusion, or give arguments to show why it 
should not. To use the system, an arguer provides input on which premises the 
audience has accepted or not. Then it searches for a path leading from these 
premises (along with others) to the ultimate probandum. When it finds such a path, 
it tells the user which premises remain to be accepted. If it finds no such path, it 
gives advice on what positions could be useful to work towards finding a path. 
Relevance of arguments has not yet been formally modeled in Carneades, but 
here we can briefly outline how this research project could plausibly be carried out, 
based on some previous work in the informal logic area. According to the analysis of 
relevance in argument given in (Walton, 2004), relevance needs to be defined and 
evaluated in a tree structure comparable to argument graphs in Carneades. There 
needs to be a central claim, often called an ultimate probandum in law, at the root of 
the tree. This framework follows the classical stasis theory well known in rhetoric 
(Hohmann, 1989; Tindale, 1999). Let AG be an argument graph containing a 
statement node, C, for the claim. We conjecture that an argument node, A, in AG is 
relevant to C if and only if there is a path from A to C in AG. Many examples of 
relevance, both in legal and ordinary arguments, are provided in (Walton, 2004). 
But of course there are other theories of relevance as well. 
Our proposed model of relevance, determined by the existence of a path 
between the argument and claim in an argument graph, seems plausible to us but 
remains a project for future work.  
 
8. CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS 
 
We take conductive arguments to be the same as pro-contra arguments. Whatever 
term you choose, the characteristic of them as a class is that they need to be 
evaluated by taking into account both the arguments for (pro) some contested claim 
as well as the (contra) arguments against it, and weigh the one side against the 
other. The term ‘conductive argument’ is taken to have been coined by Wellman 
(1971), but actually the way the word is used currently in informal logic is different 
from the narrower meaning of it given by Wellman. Wellman defined conductive 
reasoning as meeting four requirements (1971, p. 52). (1) It is about a conclusion in 
some individual case. (2) It is drawn inconclusively. (3) It is drawn from one or 
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more premises about the same case. (4) It is drawn without appeal to other cases. 
Amplifying the fourth point tells us as well that the most striking feature of all the 
examples of conductive reasoning he has given is that they all deal with particular 
cases. This definition clearly excludes arguments from analogy as fitting under the 
conductive category, since arguments from analogy compare two different cases. 
However, this restriction is widely ignored in current discussions of conductive 
argument. Argument from analogy is a very important kind of argument for informal 
logic, on our view. Much then depends on whether we stay with Wellman’s meaning 
of the term or use it a broader way to refer to all pro-contra argumentation. This 
broader way does not exclude deductive arguments. A deductive argument rebuts 
any opposing defeasible argument. Opposing pro and con deductive arguments are 
also possible, but cannot be in simultaneously unless the statements accepted by the 
audience are inconsistent. 
Wellman tells us that there are three patterns of conductive reasoning. The 
first is one where a single reason is given for the conclusion. He cited this example: 
“You ought to help him for he has been very kind to you” (1971, p. 55). This would 
be the single type of argument, of the four types classified above. The second one is 
where several reasons are given to support the conclusion. He cites this example: 
“You ought to take your son to the movie because you promised, and you have 
nothing better to do this afternoon” (1971, p. 56). This would be a convergent 
argument. The third one draws the conclusion from both positive and negative 
considerations. He cites this example: “Although your lawn needs cutting, you want 
to take your son to the movies because the picture is ideal for children and will be 
gone by tomorrow” (1971, p. 57). The third pattern shows the paradigm pro-contra 
feature of conductive arguments. 
The last example can also be classified as a convergent argument, but has an 
additional feature of interest. It is associated with the “balancing” notion of weighing 
the arguments on both sides of a disputed issue. This notion is one that many in the 
informal logic community have found so appealing while others dismiss is it as 
metaphorical (Blair & Johnson, 2011). This balance notion of deciding an issue by 
weighing one side against the other has also been found highly appealing in law, but 
there too, others have strongly criticized it as an inadequate substitute for deciding 
cases on the legal rules and the facts of a case (McFadden, 1988). 
Either of these arguments can be modeled by Carneades, and that may 
remove some of the doubts about pro-contra argument on the ground that they are 
merely metaphorical. Carneades models it using the pro-contra feature, but in a 
different way than the arguments that McFadden objected to. He objected to it as a 
balance of interests, or as a balancing of factors on either side of a disputed issue. 
But Carneades models it as a balance between opposed arguments. Carneades can 
map the lawn example as shown in figure 7. 
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You should take your 
son to the movies.
Your lawn needs cutting.
The picture is ideal for children.
The picture will be gone tomorrow.
 
Figure 7: Carneades Argument Map of Wellman’s Lawn Example 
 
As shown in figure 7, the two pro arguments are “balanced” by the con argument, 
meaning that all three arguments are “good” arguments that carry some evidential 
weight even though none of them individually, nor any subset of them, is decisive in 
proving or disproving the conclusion. Even though there are two pro arguments 
against one contra argument, the number of arguments is not the deciding factor. 
What is the deciding factor is the audience. Let us presume the audience has 
accepted all three of the premises. Should the conclusion be acceptable (in) or not? 
Even though there are two pro arguments against one contra argument, the number 
of arguments is not the deciding factor. What is the deciding factor is the audience. 
Let us presume the audience has accepted all three of the premises. Let’s assume 
that family values outweigh home care values. Then the two pro arguments, taken 
together, should prevail over the contra argument. 
The proof standards we have modeled thus far in Carneades do not compare 
the set of pro arguments against the set of con arguments, but rather only compare 
each pro argument against each con argument. Summing the weights of arguments 
to check if the sum of the weights of the pro arguments outweigh the sum of the 
weights of the con arguments only makes sense if the arguments are independent, 
to avoid double counting. Carneades can be easily extended with further proof 
standards for comparing sets of pro and con arguments, but users would need to 
take responsibility to assure that these proof standards are used only when the 
arguments are independent. These issues are discussed more thoroughly in (Gordon 
& Walton, 2009). 
More can be said about how to model this case. For example we could put in 
an enthymeme stating that lawn-cutting would leave no time for movie-going, and 
so forth. But basically Carneades can handle the pro-contra aspect, however you 
decide on the details or put in more information about what the propositions the 
audience accepts, how they weigh the arguments, and what proof standards are 
required. 
There remain some differences of opinion within the informal logic 
community on what conductive argument is, and whether it is essential for informal 
logic. In answer to an email query of mine (Sept. 12, 2012), Ralph Johnson agreed 
with the definition of conductive argument as evaluating argumentation by taking 
into account the arguments for some contested claim as well as the arguments 
against it, and weighing the one side against the other. He also agreed that this type 
of argument was characteristic of informal logic. Tony Blair (also on Sept. 12, 2012) 
had a different approach. He specified a conductive argument as one where the 
arguer has decided (or already determined) that the arguments for the claim in 
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question are good reasons for accepting it, and has also decided that the arguments 
against the claim in question are good reasons for rejecting it, but none on either 
side is decisive, and the strength of the combined arguments for accepting the claim 
outweighs the strength of the combined arguments for rejecting it. He remarked 
that he didn’t see a commitment to conductive arguments as essential for informal 
logic. These matters might be clarified in Blair’s OSSA paper on conductive 
argument.  
 
9. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have formulated ten characteristics of informal logic, based on at 
least some of the literature that has attempted to set them out in an orderly and 
clear manner, and showed why they are identifiable with the discipline of informal 
logic as a school of thought and methodology for logic. We have made our case that 
the Carneades Argumentation System can model all of these characteristics within 
its formal structure. We do not claim that Carneades is the only formal 
argumentation system that can formalize informal logic, but we hope we have 
shown that it has some advantages for doing it in a useful way as applied to “real” 
arguments. In this paper we did not use Carneades to model the argumentation in a 
fairly large real case, but this has already done elsewhere, for example in (Walton, 
2013). 
The weakest link in our chain of argumentation is our hypothesis that 
Carneades can be used to model relevance. We admit this claim requires further 
research. According to Johnson (2009, p. 29) although there have been many 
attempts to develop a theory of relevance, none of them has been entirely 
successful. However, he also added (29) that sufficiency is the RSA criterion that has 
received the least attention, and that is where Carneades is the strongest. We claim 
that a strong point of Carneades is its use of proof standards to evaluate arguments. 
This move is unusual in logic and epistemology, fields that have long suffered from 
their failure to use proof burdens and standards to determine when defeasible 
argumentation can be closed off. 
Carneades argument graphs are evaluated in stages of dialogue. The process 
of argumentation in dialogues is something else that in our opinion should be a 
characteristic of informal logic. However, there are some in the informal logic 
community, and very many in the formal logic and epistemology communities, who 
might disagree that evaluating an argument properly always requires reference to a 
conversational (dialogue) setting. Hence we have not included dialogues in this 
paper as an essential characteristic of informal logic.  
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